Developing countries frequently o¤er tax incentives and even subsidize the entry and operation of foreign …rms. I examine the optimality of such policies in an economy where growth is driven by entrepreneurial know-how, a skill that is continuously updated on the basis of the productive ideas implemented in the country. Openness allows foreign ideas to disseminate inside a country and can foster the country's domestic accumulation of knowhow. With externalities, however, laissez-faire openness is suboptimal and can be growthand even welfare-reducing. I examine the gains from openness under an optimal taxation program -the self-funding taxes on domestic and foreign …rms that maximize the welfare of the recipient country, subject to the equilibrium behavior of national and foreign …rms. Under optimal taxation, openness is always welfare enhancing and leads lagging countries to catch up with the world frontier. Yet, a country may want to subsidize the entry of foreign …rms only if it can also subsidize the domestic accumulation of know-how. I also consider the optimal tax program under a number of restrictions that developing countries typically face. For instance, a country must not subsidize entry of foreign …rms if doing so requires taxing the concurrent cohort of domestic …rms. Similarly, an international agreement that requires equal taxation of domestic and foreign …rms can be welfare reducing for a country close to the knowledge frontier.
Introduction
Entrepreneurial know-how -the skills to combine technology and market opportunities to set up and manage …rms-can be the limiting factor for a country's aggregate productivity. 1 Indeed, recent work suggests that developing countries can accrue signi…cant output and consumption gains by opening up to the skills and productive ideas in foreign …rms. 2 However, does the presence of foreign know-how enhance or impair the country's development of its own entrepreneurial skills over time? How far does openness lead a developing country to catch up with the world frontier?
What is the optimal program of taxes for domestic and foreign …rms? Should developing countries open up to foreign …rms even if they face dire …scal limitations? Should they sign international agreements that limit their taxation of foreign and domestic …rms? This paper uses a simple general equilibrium growth model to answer these questions.
I consider an economy in which entrepreneurial know-how is the engine of growth. The model is an OLG extension of a standard Lucas (1978) span-of-control economy. Entrepreneurial know-how plays a dual role. On one side, as in Lucas, it determines the productivity of the …rms managed by the old. On the other side, it provides the foundation for the young to build up their future skills. In a closed economy, only national entrepreneurs can set up …rms, shape the aggregate productivity of the country and generate the ideas upon which the young can build up their know-how. In an open economy, foreign entrepreneurs can also enter the country, combine their know-how with local labor, and enhance aggregate productivity. 3 Foreign …rms, whose entry is endogenously determined by an indi¤erence condition, make foreign ideas available to the domestic young for their acquisition of know-how. In this environment I characterize the taxation program that maximize the welfare of a developing country, subject to the equilibrium behavior of national and foreign …rms and the taxation program of the rest of the world. Then, I characterize the gains of openness under the optimal taxation program and compare them with the more traditional gains from laissez-faire openness.
A key aspect for determining the optimal policies is the extent in which knowledge is excludable.
In related work (Monge-Naranjo, 2011), I have considered a more general environment in which each young worker is exposed to ideas from two di¤erent sources: (i) the know-how of those running the …rm for which he works; and (ii) an average of the knowledge embedded in all the …rms operating in the country. In that paper, I characterize the equilibria that arises in economies with di¤erent relative weights of the two sources of ideas. In one extreme, if all knowledge is build up on the basis of source (i) -as in Boyd and Prescott (1987a,b) , Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) , and
Boldrin and Levine (2009-then ideas can be fully excludable, the costs and bene…ts of knowledge di¤usion are fully internalized, and competitive allocations are e¢cient. In this case, laissez-faire openness is always welfare enhancing, is the optimal policy and always leads the country to catch up with the knowledge frontier. These properties no longer hold when the external source (ii) has positive weight. In such case, the optimal policies for the country are no longer trivial. For tractability, in this paper I consider the opposite extreme, where all the weight is in (ii). With externalities as the mechanism by which knowledge di¤uses puts the analysis in this paper in line with a common assumption in the growth literature (e.g. Romer 1986 , Klenow 1998 and Jones 2006) , the impact of openness to trade on growth (e.g. Stokey 1991 ) and the impact of openness to multinational …rms (e.g. Findlay 1978 ).
With knowledge externalities, not surprisingly, laissez-faire openness is not necessarily e¢cient, since the non-excludability of knowledge di¤usion keeps market transactions from making sure that socially e¢cient knowledge transfers take place, both within and between countries. More interestingly, despite the apparent 'free-lunch' of knowledge spillovers, laissez-faire openness can be growth-and even welfare-reducing. Entry of foreign …rms is determined by (marginal) pro…t equalization and fails to internalize the impact on the country's exposure to learn. Indeed, laissezfaire (zero taxes) openness may fail to push developing countries to catch up with the rest of the world, even if individuals in those countries have the same preferences, policies and inherent capacity to learn, and no barriers to knowledge are present. 4 In this paper, I examine the optimal (Pigou-Ramsey) dynamic taxation of both domestic and foreign …rms, where the taxes are chosen so as to maximize the welfare of the recipient country, subject to the budget constraint of the government and the equilibrium behavior of national and foreign agents. I allow governments to impose proportional taxes rates on the net income (pro…ts) of domestic and foreign …rms operating in the country. Tax rates are uniform across individuals with the same nationality but can be di¤erent across nationalities. They can also vary over time.
In the baseline case, I also allow taxes of the net income of the domestic workers (wages), which in this environment are e¤ectively lump-sum taxes. The taxation program considered is in the context of a small economy which is initially less developed than the rest of the world. Taxes in the rest of the world play an important role shaping the optimal taxes in a country, and will be assumed to be constant over time. The baseline case assumes that the rest of the world also 4 For a detailed analysis of these results and the role of occupation choices, see Monge-Naranjo (2011).
3 sets taxes optimally. Most of the analysis also assumes full commitment on behalf of the home government. Later on, the paper explores suboptimal foreign taxation and the constraints imposed by a country's temptation to expropriate foreign …rms.
I use a primal approach for solving the optimal taxation program. Given a tax sequence, competitive allocations are fully pinned down by the time (t = 0; 1; :::) sequences of two numbers:
a ratio R t of the relative know-how of domestic …rms relative to the know-how of foreign …rms, and a fraction m t of the domestic labor under the control of foreign …rms. Then, optimal taxes on foreign and domestic …rms are solved for with a simple Bellman equation that de…nes the optimal transition from (R t , m t ) to (R t+1 , m t+1 ). Relative to a closed economy, the optimal program may allow for non-zero m t and R t may change over time even if the countries in the rest of the world tax their respective domestic …rms optimally. Relative to laissez-faire openness, taxes (subsidies) on foreign …rms can reduce (expand) the amount of entry of foreign know-how and the country's overall exposure to productive ideas.
The prescription for optimal taxes on domestic know-how is as expected: A Pigouvian subsidy is needed to internalize the positive externality of productive ideas of active entrepreneurs on the know-how accumulation of future generations. More interestingly, the level of these Pigouvian subsidies depends on the country's policies on openness, since the gap between the social and private returns to skills is larger in open economies. With respect to foreign …rms, optimal taxes must balance the positive and negative impacts of openness in the net present value of resources for the country. There are two positive impacts: (a) static gains in the country's national output, and (b) a reduction in the cost of accumulating domestic know-how. There is one negative impact, the negative impact of future entry and competition of foreign …rms on the domestic return of accumulating know-how. The positives are associated with current entry and the negative with future entry, so the optimal taxation program must balance o¤ the dynamic interplay between them.
The baseline case assumes that the rest of the world is the balanced-growth path (BGP)
as de…ned by the optimal taxation program of a closed economy. 5 As anticipated, the optimal tax program for an open economy dominates the best closed economy program (i.e. taxation programs restricted to m t = 0 for all t); therefore, contrary to the case of laissez-faire, under optimal taxation, the gains from openness are always positive. Similarly, the optimal tax program also dominates laissez-faire openness. In general, while countries that are really low in know-how may …nd it optimal to collect some of the foreign pro…ts via taxes, I …nd that countries that are close to the frontier …nd it optimal to subsidize entry of foreign …rms, i.e. the optimal allocation exhibits shares m t higher than the corresponding ones under laissez-faire (zero taxes/subsidies).
In those case, subsidies to foreign …rms are also met with higher subsidies to domestic …rms, and over time the ratio R t approaches 1. Therefore, contrary to laissez-faire openness, under optimal taxation, countries that are su¢ciently developed end up catching up with the world frontier.
I consider two substantial departures from the baseline case. First, I consider cases in which the rest of the world follows a suboptimal taxation program. On one hand, if the rest of the world is under-accumulating know-how (subsidies below the Pigouvian rate), the optimal taxation program would lead an initially less-developed country to catch-up and eventually surpass the rest of the world. In such a case, the ratio R t would diverge to plus in…nity as the country would consistently outgrew the rest of the world. On the other hand, if the rest of the world is over-accumulating know-how (subsidies above the Pigouvian rate), then catching up is not part of the optimal policy for the country. The country would converge to a BGP with the same growth rate as the rest of the world, but with know-how levels below the rest of the world (R 1 < 1). The higher growth rate of the country would be sustained by positive entry of foreign …rms (m 1 > 0) overtime.
The second departure is in terms of limitations to the tax instruments that the country can use. Such limitations can arise, for example, from the inability of countries to tax workers. 6 This would imply that any subsidies that are provided to foreign (domestic) …rms must be …nanced with taxes on domestic (foreign) …rms. The primal formulation of the problem could be readily adapted to add such a constraint for the case when that the budget constraint of the government must be balanced period by period. Relative to the unrestricted program, this constraint can substantially reduce the gains from openness. However, it is always the case that the gains from openness are positive.
Tax programs can be also limited by the country's inability to tax foreign …rms di¤erently from domestic ones or to tax them at all. These restrictions could arise as part of international agreements, e.g. WTO or NAFTA. Consider …rst the restriction of zero taxes (or subsidies)
to foreign …rms. With such a restriction the gains from openness are reduced relative to the unrestricted program but are still positive relative to autarkic economies. Entry of foreign …rms would be given by the laissez-faire condition and as such the planner cannot use taxes to internalize the transfer of know-how from foreign …rms. However, subsidies on domestic …rms can still be used in the open economy, and in general will be higher in response to the entry of foreign know-how.
While the country might fail to catch up, in general domestic …rms will attain a higher ratio R t as result of openness. Consider now a di¤erent restriction, equal taxation of domestic and foreign …rms. Interestingly, in the context of this model, the equality of tax rates between foreign and domestic leads m t+1 to be equal to the laissez-faire openness. The country can still choose a 6 More generally, any other inelastic factor of production.
5 di¤erent R t+1 from that of laissez-faire, but in general the gains from openness can be severely reduced. Indeed, similarly to the laissez-faire case, the country may fail to catch up and the gains from openness can be negative if the country is initially close to the knowledge frontier.
As indicated above, the model of knowledge formation in this paper is based on Monge-Naranjo (2011). However, that paper and related work by Beaudry and Francois (2010), Dasgupta (2010) and Sampson (2011), restrict attention to comparing complete openness with complete closedness. 
The Model
Consider a discrete time, in…nite horizon OLG economy with a single consumption good. Individuals live for two periods. In each period, the population consists of equal sized cohorts (normalized to one) of young and old persons. A person born at time t that consumes c
As in Lucas (1978) , the consumption good is produced by '…rms', teams of one manager and a group of workers. Managers can also be seen as entrepreneurs since they will be the residual of …rms. 7 The (person-speci…c) skills or knowledge of an entrepreneur determines the productivity of the …rm under his control. With z 0 units of entrepreneurial skills and n 0 units of labor, a …rm produces y = zn , units of the consumption good. The degree 2 (0; 1) of decreasing returns to labor n is also the span-of-control parameter in this economy. 8 In each period of life, every person has an endowment of one unit of time. When young, that unit can only be supplied as labor; when old time can only be supplied as skilled entrepreneurial services, i.e. setting up and controlling a …rm. 9 The returns to entrepreneurship are foreseen by the young as they decide how much to invest in acquiring skills.
Accumulation of skills is made on the basis of the productive ideas to which youth is exposed to. Let z t is the same for all of the agents in the country that are young in period t. In particular, I will assume that
where 0 1 will be called the internalization parameter because it determines how much a young person learns internally from his job, and, as explained below, the extent in which knowledge spillovers can be internalized with the contractual relationship between a manager and his workers.
Notice that z E is increasing and linearly homogeneous in the levels of both sources of knowledge.
Moreover, notice that there are no "size" e¤ects, i.e. the absolute number (mass) of …rms does not impact the level z E .
The average Z O t is a national "public good", i.e. a non-rival factor available to everyone in the country. 10 It is determined as follows: Let t be the (endogenous, as explained below) probability measure that indicates the allocation of the country's total labor across …rms with di¤erent knowledge levels. That is, for any Borel set B R + , t (B) indicates the share of the labor in control of entrepreneurs with knowledge levels in B. Then, Z O t is a generalized (or Hölder) weighted mean of all the active …rms:
where the parameter can assume any value in the extended real numbers. This formulation encompasses many familiar average formulas. The arithmetic, geometric and harmonic means correspond to, respectively, = 1; 0; and 1. If ! 1, Z the exposure to ideas -and hence, the ability to accumulate skills-are uniquely determined by one's own …rm. This gives rise to a richer relationship between young and old entrepreneurs, one that fully internalize the costs and bene…ts of accumulating skills. Such is the view in Boyd and Prescott (1987a,b) , Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) , Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) , and others. By allowing any 0 1, the model here combines the impact of externalities with labor markets that compensate for di¤erences in the learning opportunities across …rms with di¤erent knowledge levels.
Finally, a government in the country collects taxes and (possibly) disburses subsidies. Following the Ramsey tradition, I assume that governments can only charge proportional taxes on the netincome of the di¤erent individuals. However, I allow these taxes to vary across types of individuals.
In particular, let
denote, respectively, the tax rates on the net-earnings of domestic workers, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign entrepreneurs operating inside the country for each period t 0. Tax rates can be negative (subsidies) but can never be above 1. For simplicity, I assume zero government expenditures but the analysis can be easily extended to economies in which the government spends a constant fraction of the country's domestic output.
Competitive Equilibria
I consider perfect foresight competitive equilibria. The key component of the price system is a sequence of wages function w = fw t :
, where w t (z) is the price that an entrepreneur with skills z pays for a unit of labor at time t. The dependence of the price on the old manager's skill z is explained below. The discount factor pins down the interest rate. Equilibrium prices and allocations depend also on the tax policy , and a government budget constraint must be satis…ed.
First I characterize the individually optimal decisions, given policies and prices w. Start with the the decisions of an old entrepreneur who has already acquired a given level of skills z.
Facing market wages w t (z), he attains pre-tax earnings [z;
Net-of-taxes, his income is
Notice that because the tax E t is on his net-income it does not distort his optimal hiring of labor,
which is increasing and convex in z and decreasing in w t (z).
is strictly increasing and convex; given z, (z; ) is strictly decreasing in w t (z). The total response of the functions and n to variations in z will be even more steeply positive and convex in z because, as seen below, the equilibrium function w t (z) is non-increasing in z.
Next, consider the decision problem of a young person. He must select the …rm for which to work, and how much to invest in entrepreneurial skills. With respect to the latter, given an exposure to ideas z E and the next period's cost of labor w t+1 ( ), the optimal investment in entrepreneurial skills z 0 solves
Here, I am assuming that investments in skill formation z E z 0 =z E are not deductible from labor earning taxes. 11 The key determinant of the optimal investment in skills z 0 are the exposure to ideas z E , the future cost of labor w t+1 ( ) and the foreseen taxes E t+1 on entrepreneurial labor. Under the conditions laid out in Proposition 1 below, optimal investments in skills are determined by the condition
where 1 ( ) and 2 ( ) stand for, respectively, the …rst derivative of with respect to the the skill z of the manager and the wage w t+1 (z) he will have to pay for labor.
Let z t+1 = t z E denote the optimal accumulation of skills for each period t. It is increasing in z E as a better exposure of ideas reduces the marginal costs of investment, i.e. the RHS of equation (7). However, as discussed in detail in Monge-Naranjo (2011), if z E is too low, the optimal choice may be zero as those youth will remain workers when old. The function t ( ) is shaped by the wage function w t+1 ( ). Higher future wages, i.e. higher levels for w t+1 ( ), reduce the investment in skills because it reduces the marginal return to skills in production ( 12 > 0). Moreover, the slope of w t+1 ( ) also matters for investment in skills. Because 2 < 0, the more skilled entrepreneurs will pay lower wages because their workers value the better learning opportunities. Finally, notice that t ( ) is directly a¤ected by the tax rate E t+1 on the returns to entrepreneurial knowledge. When choosing which …rms to work for, the young fully perceive the implied di¤erences in learning opportunities across …rms. For simplicity, as in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) and others, all young individuals are assumed to be identical. In equilibrium, they must be indi¤erent to work for the di¤erent active …rms. Then, the wages paid by …rms with two di¤erent know-how levels 11 If investment costs were not tax-deductible, then V z E ; w t+1 ( ) ;
With this alternative assumption, the precise formulas below will be changed but not the substance of the results. z 0 < z 1 must compensate for di¤erences in learning opportunities,
where the implied exposure to ideas in the two …rms are z
Less skilled managers must pay higher wages, w t (z 0 ) w t (z 1 ) as the higher skilled managers provide better learning opportunities, V z
Let t be a positive and …ne measure that describes the managers operating in the country at time t. In general, t can be composed of a measure of domestic managers H t and a measure of foreign managers F t . For reasons that will become apparent below, I assume that t has a bounded support in the non-negative numbers. Given wages w t (z), the amount of labor hired by an entrepreneur with skill level z is given by (5) , and the distribution of labor employed across skill levels is given by
, for any Borel set B.
In each period t, the government collects (or pays if negative) taxes from domestic entrepreneurs, foreign entrepreneurs and domestic workers in the amounts. As of time t = 0, the government budget constraint, is given by
because the government has zero expenditures.
Given a government policy = , and sequences of aggregate exposure to ideas
, and non-negative measures of domestic and foreign …rms
the government budget constraint (10) is satis…ed for t = 0. For any t 0:
n [z; w t (z)] solve the pro…t maximization problem of the old; (iii) V z E ; w t+1 ( ) ; ; t z E solve the optimal acquisition of skills for the young for any level z for any Borel set A R + , and (vi) market-clearing for the domestic labor market that pin down
. This de…nition is incomplete as it lacks the optimal entry decisions of foreign …rms. In the next two sections, I complete the de…nition with alternative assumptions regarding whether the country is "closed" or "open" and on the behavior of the tax policy .
A Closed Economy
This section considers a closed economy, de…ned as the case when 
Homogeneous Managers
Consider …rst the case when all of the have the same level of knowledge z = Z 0 > 0, i.e. Therefore, at time t = 0 all …rms pay the same wage w 0 > 0 and hire the same units of labor, n 0 = 1. Moreover, since all the young are exposed to the same level of ideas and foresee the same wage function w 1 ( ) for t = 1, they invest the same amount in skills Z 1 > 0. Then
The same logic applies for any period t and the initial homogeneity will be preserved over all the generations. Thus, the entire dynamics of the country can be traced by a sequence fZ t g 1 t=0 of knowledge levels for each generation.
Under those circumstances, n t = 1 for all …rms. Workers wages and entrepreneurs' pro…ts are equal to w t = Z t and t = (1 ) Z t , respectively. Using these, and de…ning G t Z t+1 =Z t to be the gross growth rate of knowledge, the optimality condition (7) boils down to
Clearly, higher taxes E t+1 reduce the accumulation of knowledge G t by the current young generation because they reduce their marginal net-of-taxes returns. More interestingly, the current accumulation G t of knowledge is higher when future young generations are foreseen to accumulate more knowledge, i.e. when G t+1 is higher, because the returns to accumulate knowledge are not only in terms of producing goods but also in terms of producing skills for the future generations.
Restrict attention now to balance growth paths (BGP), equilibria in which entrepreneurial knowledge grows at a constant rate G. The value of G must be a root of the implied equation
The following results are proved in the appendix:
Proposition 1 (Closed economy BGP) Consider a closed economy with constant tax rates
Then the following hold: (a) An equilibrium nondegenerate BGP exists if either (i) = 0 and v > 1= (1 ) or (ii) > 0, and 1
if an equilibrium BGP exists it is unique; (c) the economy exhibits sustained
, a closed economy initially populated by homogeneous entrepreneurs remains homogeneous and in the unique BGP; that is, other nonexplosive ‡uctuations in G t are ruled out.
The curvature parameter v must be high enough for a BGP to exist. Otherwise, it may be possible that the left-hand-side of (12) always lays above the right-hand-side; if so, the optimal accumulation would be degenerated to +1. Under conditions in part (a) there are two roots, but the higher one is ruled out because it corresponds to a local minimum. Being in the lower root also rules out self-ful…lling (extrinsic) ‡uctuations.
The condition E > = (1 ) arises from the budget constraint of the government (10) since the government cannot impose a tax W 1 on workers to subsidize entrepreneurs. Other than that, the government could set any tax E < 1 because it e¤ectively disposes of lump-sum taxation on workers.
Heterogeneous Managers
Consider now a non-degenerate but bounded support in the distribution of skills for the initial old generation. 13 For any level z, and given Z O t+1 , w t+1 ( ) and w t+2 ( ), the …rst order condition for the optimal acquisition of skills z 0 is
With all of this, after simplifying, equation (7) becomes
13 Boundedness is required. Otherwise only the limiting entrepreneur would hire the entire mass of young workers.
where
@z 0 , and then the envelope condition on (6) to get
. See Monge-Naranjo (2011) for further details.
The proof of the following limited but useful results are also in Monge-Naranjo (2011).
Proposition 2 Assume constant taxes
. If an equilibrium exist: (a) the
in the support of t .
Albeit limited, this simple result has important implications for the limiting behavior of the skill distribution:
, then, any equilibrium starting with initial distribution with bounded support will asymptotically converge to a homogenous …rms BGP.
Most obviously, if = 0, pre-existing heterogeneity disappears after one period. More interest-
e. one's own manager is a leading source of ideas, then pre-existing di¤erences in the exposure to ideas will lead to widening gaps in skill formation. In this case, the economy exhibits dispersion-induced homogeneity: It converges to a pool of homogeneous entrepreneurs because the top end of the distribution reproduces at a faster pace than the lower end;
in the limit, all the remaining entrepreneurs would be the o¤springs of the initially highest skilled entrepreneur(s).
E¢cient Allocations
In this section I consider allocations that maximize the net-present value of the country's aggregate consumption. I …rst discuss the social planner's allocation of (young) labor n t (z) across old managers and the investment decisions z t+1 (z) on each young worker at time t. Then, I show how some of those allocations can be decentralized with the appropriate tax rates.
Given a initial distribution 0 , a social planner would choose sequences fn t : R + ! R + g 1 t=0 and fz t+1 : R + ! R + g 1 t=0 , to maximize the value of
subject to the adding up constraint Z R + n t (z) t (dz) = 1, and the law of motion for the distribution of skills
Here z
is the implied exposure to ideas of each worker, as pinned down by each person's own manager z, and the outside exposure to ideas as pinned down by t and n t .
A social planner internalizes two aspects of labor allocations and learning decisions that are omitted in a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium. First, the investments z t+1 (z) also consider the impact on the exposure to ideas for all future young workers, not only those working for the individual entrepreneur. Second, the allocation of labor n t (z) also consider the implied impact on the exposure to ideas of all current young workers. This e¤ect is positive for high z and negative for low z.
The internalization of these two forces magni…es the di¤erences in the allocation of labor and in the learning investments across …rms with di¤erent managerial skills levels. The proof for the following proposition is in the Appendix:
and n
denote, respectively, the labor allocation and knowledge formation for the laissez-faire and social planners allocations. If 0 < 1 and 1 < < 1, n
for any z 0 < z 1 and t 0 for which the ratios are well de…ned.
Both of these forces implies that in any point in time, the e¢cient allocations leads to a more dispersion and therefore, to a faster convergence to homogeneity than in the laissez-faire allocation.
If (when) initially the old cohort of managers is homogeneous, the planning problem is fairly simple. Assume that all the current crop of old managers have the same expertise Z t > 0. The planner must decide the units of labor to assign to each manager and the skills Z t+1 to invest in each of the young workers. Because learning is the same in all …rms, the decreasing returns in production implies that all managers must command the same amount of labor, n t . Aggregating over …rms, aggregate output of goods is Z t . It is evident also that it is optimal to invest the same knowledge Z t+1 in each of the future managers. The aggregate cost of learning formation is
In recursive form, the value function S (Z) for the planner is de…ned by the Bellman Equation (BE):
Notice that the period return function Z [1 (Z 0 =Z)] is linearly homogeneous and jointly concave in (Z; Z 0 ) and that the feasible set for Z 0 does not depend on Z. These properties lead to the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume that parameter conditions in Proposition 1 hold for = 1. Then, the unique solution to (14) has the form S (Z n ) = S 0 Z n for 0 < S 0 < 1 given by
Moreover, the value G that solves this maximization coincides with the laissez-faire G for = 1.
Let G SP and G LF denote the growth rate in the social planner's and in the laissez-faire allocations, respectively. When < 1, G SP > G LF , because the individual entrepreneur only captures the returns on his knowledge accumulation that accrued in his pro…ts and not on the aggregate stock of ideas circulating for future generations. However, for the case of homogeneous managers, the implementation of the socially e¢cient accumulation of knowledge is fairly simple. It involves simple proportional Pigouvian taxes. The following result is straightforward to verify:
i , and
then the allocation of labor and formation of knowledge in a competitive equilibrium with constant taxes E , W coincide with the socially e¢cient ones.
When < 1, a subsidy, i.e. E < 0, is required to induce young entrepreneurs to accumulate more knowledge and internalize the social bene…ts for subsequent generations. To …nance these subsidies, a labor tax W > 0 is required. 14 
Open Economies
Assume now that the home country allows foreign managers to set up …rms and hire domestic labor. 15 The entry of foreign skills and ideas can impact the domestic accumulation of knowledge 14 Even if labor taxes are non-distortionary it may be possible that the e¢cient allocation cannot be implemented. The equation for E de…nes a quadratic expression, so it might be possible that two di¤erent tax rates pairs E , W implement the e¢cient allocation. 15 I will assume that individuals from the home country cannot move. This is without loss of generality for workers and old entrepreneurs, since, in equilibrium they will be indi¤erent between moving to foreign or remaining in home. However, ruling out the possibility for domestic young potential entrepreneurs to move and "grow up" in the developed country is crucial. I will discuss further below the factual and analytical relevance of this assumption.
in two opposite ways. One one hand, foreign managers expose their ideas to local workers, directly to those under their control, and indirectly to all others via their impact on Z O t . On the other hand, the expectation of foreign entry increases the foreseeable future cost of labor and reduces the total and marginal return to investing in knowledge. The balance between the two forces is also determined by the taxation program chosen by the government.
For simplicity, I focus on the case where = 0, i.e. when all the exposure to ideas is external to the …rm and all the young agents perceive the same set of ideas Z O t . Aside tractability, such a case also captures the literature's emphasis on externalities. 16 I assume that the home country is initially less developed than the rest of the world. Also, for clarity and concreteness, I make other ancillary assumptions: First, both home and foreign are initially populated by homogeneous managers. That is, at time t = 0, Z h 0 < Z f t , where, as with all other variables, the super-indexes h and f stand for "home" and "foreign." Second, the home country is "small," i.e. its policies do not a¤ect the aggregate dynamics of the foreign country. Third, the rest of the world is in a BGP with growth G f , and foreign entrepreneurs face a constant tax (subsidy) rate E f if they remain in the foreign country. As a benchmark case I will use E f to be equal to the Pigouvian rate, i.e. G f = G SP ; however, I will also comment on cases outside this benchmark.
I now de…ne the relevant state variables for an open economy. Let
e. the level of know-how of domestic …rms relative to the know-how of foreign …rms. The ratio R t will be useful since the absolute levels of knowledge grow over time. Also, de…ne m t to be the fraction of domestic labor under the control of foreign …rms in any period t. The dynamics of the home country will be entirely determined by the behavior of these two variables. That is, the state of the economy is the pair (m t ; R t ) 2 [0; 1] R + .
For any arbitrary state (m t ; R t ), I …rst characterize the determination of (m t+1 ; R t+1 ) and the value of other relevant variables. Then, I look at the behavior of the economy and the for the closed state (m 0 ; R 0 ) = (0; R) to evaluate the gains from openness.
Given the state (m t ; R t ), the average quality of the ideas surrounding the youth in the country is equal to
an average of domestic and foreign ideas, with weights 1 m t and m t , respectively. In relative terms, let R O t be the ratio of ideas that the domestic young are exposed to, relative to their foreign peers, i.e.,
. 16 See Monge-Naranjo (2011) for the general case 0 1, but restricted to comparing laissez-faire openness ( F = 0) with complete closedness ( F = 1).
Obviously,
Inasmuch as Z h t < Z f t (i.e. R t < 1), the entry of foreign …rms in period t (i.e. m t > 0), R O t > R t , as foreign ideas increase the average relative to R t . However, as long as m t < 1, then R O t < 1, and the domestic youth are being exposed to inferior ideas than those available to the foreign young.
The previous formulas are in terms of m t which is an equilibrium object. Speci…cally, foreign …rms enter the country up to the point in which the last one is indi¤erent between moving or staying. In this simple model that holds when producing at home or abroad produce the same the after-tax pro…ts. Given the taxes E f in the foreign country and the tax F t to be paid in the home country, and the domestic and foreign wages w h t and w f t , the condition that determines entry of foreign …rms is
and at least one the inequalities holds with equality. 17 Using the expressions for (Z f t ; w h t ), and the domestic labor market clearing condition, the equilibrium share m t is given by
As for the exposure to ideas R O t , using the equilibrium m t , we get
otherwise.
In all these equations, the …rst branch indicates that foreign …rms will not enter if home country taxes are too high relative to the foreign country taxes and/or the domestic competition, R t , is too high.
The dynamic behavior of R t+1 is determined by the optimal accumulation of knowledge by domestic entrepreneurs. That is,
The solution to this optimization problem depends on whether in the next period, foreign …rms will enter the country or not. Using the functional form of ( ; ) and the equilibrium values for w h t+1 when m t+1 > 0 and when m t+1 = 0, the dynamic behavior of the domestic knowledge Z h t+1 is
(1
, where In relative terms, using the fact that foreign growth is G f = 1 E f =v 0 1=v , the dynamics can be simpli…ed to:
, Notice that either description of the dynamics is incomplete, since it depends on the undetermined value of m t+1 , which also has to be consistent with equilibrium conditions and the government budget constraint. This incompleteness arises because I have not yet speci…ed the determination of the tax program
In the reminder of this section and in the next, I consider the the cases of zero taxes (laissez-faire), optimal tax programs (Ramsey) and restricted optimal taxes, where at least one of the tax rates is exogenously restricted.
Laissez-Faire
First, consider the case in which the home country adheres to laissez-faire, where all taxes are zero. For simplicity, let us focus …rst on the case in which the foreign country also has zero taxes.
Since foreign entrepreneurs can freely enter the home country, and since we are abstracting from mobility frictions or taxes, foreign entrepreneurs operating at home must earn f = (1 ) Z f ,
i.e. their pro…ts at foreign. This can only happen under factor price equalization:
i.e., the cost of labor (in e¢ciency units) is the same in both countries. 
which is strictly decreasing in R t . If R t = 1, domestic entrepreneurs are at par with the foreign ones and dissipate any saving in labor costs from moving across countries. On the contrary if R t = 0, all the domestic labor force would be under foreign management.
Under laissez-faire, the domestic exposure to ideas has a closed-form solution. Plugging expression (18) in the formula (16), R O t is equal to:
Notice however that R O t may not be always increasing in R t . On the one hand, a higher R t increases R O t because domestic …rms are a better source of ideas. On the other hand, a higher ratio R t reduces the entry of foreign …rms and their productive ideas. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1 , if > 1= (1 ), the negative force dominates for values of R t close to zero but the positive force dominates for higher values of R t . As shown in the …gure, if 1= (1 ), the complementarity in the two source of ideas is so strong that R O t is globally increasing in R t . The transition function under laissez-faire can also be solved in closed-form. The next period ratio R t+1 is simply given by
Since > 1, the country's relative knowledge for the next period R t+1 is strictly increasing and convex in the current relative exposure R O t to ideas. However, it is always the case that R t+1 < R O t , i.e. domestic entrepreneurs, in relative terms, never fully match up with the level of ideas with which they are exposed to. The reason is that they foresee the next-period entry of (and competition from) foreign entrepreneurs who are being trained with better with overall better ideas Z This simple result shows that, except for a the leaders with R = 1, initial conditions do not matter for the long-run relative income of countries under a laissez-faire openness regime. However, this form of openness does not push developing countries all the way to catch up with the rest of the world. Even technologies, preferences and inherent capacity to learn are the same and barriers or distortions to the mobility of knowledge are absent, the presence of externalities implies that cross-country di¤erences in the exposure to and creation of skills and ideas will be preserved over time.
Initial conditions matter, however, for the impact of openness on the relative income (transitional growth) and welfare of the country. On one hand, countries with a very low initial level of knowledge would experience dramatic gains from laissez-faire openness. On the other hand, countries that are initially close to the frontier, i.e. R 0 2 R int ; 1 would experience a slow-down and will end up lagging further behind their initial position.
Albeit more favorable, similar implications hold in terms of welfare. To see this, it is straightforward to show that because the marginal product of labor is equalized between the two coun- 
Under the counter-factual of remaining closed, at time t aggregate consumption would have been
As reported below, it is straightforward to compute transition paths and the implied net (present value) aggregate gains of openness,
1.
A simpler calculation is the cross-BGP or steady state consumption gains between the interior BGP and the closed economy BGP with initial ratio
an expression derived using the de…nition of and then simplifying. The following result is immediate:
Then laissez-faire openness lead to a (steady state) reduction in the aggregate consumption of countries with initial knowledge
How can a country lose domestic knowledge when it is exposed to superior knowledge from abroad? In this model, it is possible that the in ‡ow of foreign ideas is more than compensated by a reduction in the domestic individual's incentives to build up skills, which can result in an overall decline in sets of ideas
in the country. Depending on initial conditions, this negative impact on pro…ts can overcome the gains of openness on the wages of the young and national output can fall. For overall welfare to fall, however, it is needed that the net of these two e¤ects is negative enough so that the potential gains from reductions in the cost of training
is big enough. This model shows that that is certainly possible. See Monge-Naranjo (2011) for some quantitative evaluations of the gains from openness in an extended version of this model.
This section has examined the income and welfare gains from openness under the notion that openness narrowly understood as laissez-faire. That is the notion most commonly adopted in the literature. However, as argued in the ensuing section, this conceptual restriction is unwarranted.
A Ramsey Program
Following the Ramsey tradition, let us now assume that the objective of the home government is to maximize the average welfare of the country, but that the tools available are restricted to some
given the OLG structure, implicitly weights the welfare of di¤erent generations on the basis of the individuals' discount factor .
To solve for the Ramsey program, I use the primal approach, i.e. instead of maximizing over the di¤erent taxes
F t , I solve for a social planner's problems in terms of allocations that correspond to competitive equilibria for feasible taxation programs, taking as given the initial level of knowledge of both countries Z h 0 and Z f 0 and the tax rate E f and growth path G f in the foreign country. In any period, the aggregate consumption equals the domestic wages and domestic pro…ts, the taxes collected from (or the subsidies pay to) foreign pro…ts minus the cost of acquiring skills, i.e.
where q f t is the mass of foreign …rms in the home country at time t. Ramsey allocations can be solved as follows: given the state R t , the planner chooses the mass m t of labor controlled by foreign …rms and the country's next period knowledge level relative to foreign, R t+1 . From (??) a value of m t > 0 implies
m t = 0 is compatible with any
On the other hand, there is a highest attainable m (R t ) < 1 which corresponds to the highest feasible subsidy F (R t ) > 0 …nanced with taxes levied domestic workers and domestic …rms. 19 Thus, we can restrict attention to m t 2 (R t ) = [0; m (R t )]. In those cases:
and plugged into (5) implies n (1 m t ) , and the country's total collection of taxes from (disbursement of subsidies to) foreign …rms is
which, given R t and E f , is a non-montone (La¤er) curve; it is zero for m t = 0 and m t = m
; positive inside these two points and negative for m t > m LF t , where m LF t indicates the level that would take place if the government imposes zero taxes at time t.
Finally, as a function of m t , the relative exposure to ideas in the country is R
and the cost of acquiring a relative knowledge R t+1 for the next generation is Z
Adding the elements in (21) and simplifying, we obtain C t = Z f t % (R t ; m t ; R t+1 ) where
As a fraction of Z f t , the …rst term indicates the amount of resources available to consume or to invest in the period. These resources are single-picked in m t ; initially they increase in m t but eventually they decrease and become negative as m t approaches 1. The second term is the cost of knowledge accumulation. It is always decreasing in m t and strictly increasing in R t+1 . There is an important complementarity between m t and R t+1 , as the marginal cost of investing in skills R t+1 is decreasing in m t . 20 As a practical matter, this property will imply a complementarity between openness (and even subsidies) to foreign …rms and government incentives for domestic investment in knowledge.
To solve for the Ramsey program, we can eliminate Z f t , and leave R t as the only state. The value function # (R) associated with the Ramsey program solves the Bellman equation
In the appendix, standard recursive methods are used to prove the following proposition. program, e.g.
(ii) non-optimal foreign policies, G f 7 G SP . Sequel to this paper: large country issues, including the analysis of strategic interactions.
Restrictions on the Taxation Program
Up until now, I have characterized the optimal taxation programs under fairly unrestricted conditions. I have assumed that (a) the government is not bound by international agreements on the taxation of foreign …rms; (b) the government can freely discrimininate between domestic and foreign …rms; (c) the government can …nance subsidies to foreign and/or domestic …rms with taxes on workers (which in this environment are essentially lump-sum taxes); and (d) the government is able to commit to not to expropriate foreign …rms once they have enter. In this section I examine the implications of relaxing each of these conditions on the optimal taxation program and on the gains from openness.
Zero Taxes/Subsidies on Foreign Firms
Bilateral and multilateral agreements (e.g. the WTO) may restrict the ability of governments to either impose taxes on or provide subsidies to foreign …rms. In this spirit, consider the optimal taxation of domestic workers and …rms under the constraint that in every point in time taxes on foreign …rms are zero, i.e.
F t = 0. Given R t , the restriction to zero taxes implies that m t equals the static laissez-faire or free entry (FE) level, i.e.
Under this policy, the country's period payo¤ is entirely determined by the current state R t and the next period R t+1 . De…ne % LF (R t ; R t+1 ) % R t ; m LF (R t ) ; R t+1 . Then, a little algebra leads to
Overtime, the government can still a¤ect the path m t as the chosen domestic taxes in ‡uence the path of fR t g 1 t=0 . In recursive form, the primal of the optimal taxation of domestic …rms under laissez-faire openness is given by the solution of
Then, given the solution of the above program, for any initial (m; R), the optimal taxation at the period before laissez-faire openness was imposed becomes
Results:
If Even when m t = 0, the home country would grow at rate G SP > G f .
Gains from openness always positive, as laissez-faire openness does not impose restrictions on domestic subsidies. But restrictions can seriously reduce the gains from openness. Graph
Equal taxation of Domestic and Foreign Firms
An alternative restriction can be the inability of the government to di¤erentiate between domestic or foreign …rms for taxation purposes. One source of such restriction could be bilateral or multilateral agreements of the country. Another rationale for such restriction is that …rms may be able to manipulate the legal incorporation of their operations to be of either nationality. In either case, I now consider the optimal taxation program subject to the constraint of equal taxation (ET) for any period t onwards,
Forcing the tax program to equalize the tax rates on foreign and domestic pro…ts sharply constraints the ability of the country to accumulate knowledge. Equalizing expressions (tauE) and (tauF) and leads to the following simple result:
Lemma 9 Take foreign taxes E f as given and assume that
. Moreover, as long as R t < 1, the optimal taxation program always select m t+1 > 0.
Interestingly, domestic accumulation of knowledge behaves similarly to the laissez-faire openness case. Given the predetermined values of m t and R t , and as long as the tax rate is low enough so that m t+1 > 0. In this model, under uniform taxation, the tax (dis)incentives for domestic knowledge accumulation are exactly compensated by the aligned (dis)incentives provided to the entry of foreign knowledge.
Obviously, the allocations in this restricted optimal taxation program need not coincide with laissez-faire, as the program optimally reshapes the behavior of m t over time, and with it, the behavior of R t . To de…ne the taxation program in recursive primal form, de…ne
The optimal taxation program subject to equal taxation of foreign and domestic …rms is given by the solution to the BE # ET (m; R) = max
The …rst order condition determining m is
No Taxation of Workers
The benchmark case analyzed in the previous sections and the constrained taxation programs studied in this one, all presume that the government can …nance subsidies to domestic and or foreign …rms by taxing the (young) workers in the country. Since current labor supply decisions of workers are inelastic, those taxes are e¤ectively a source of lump-sum taxation. In practice, however, many countries face serious di¢culties taxing its population.
In this subsection I consider the optimal taxation and the gains of openness when the government must balance its budget period by period and cannot resort to taxes on domestic labor.
In such case, any subsidies provided to foreign (domestic) …rms must neceesarily entail a tax on domestic (foreign) …rms. Speci…cally, when W t = 0 and no borrowing is allowed, then the ‡ow budget constraint of the government must be balanced, i.e. 
Expropriation Incentives
Now, consider the case in which the government cannot pre-commit not to expropriate the foreign …rms after they have enter the country. That is, in any period t, instead of collecting (or paying if negative) 
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Doing so, obviously, would trigger reputation and retaliation costs and possibly other punishments for the country, at least for some periods. For simplicity, assume that the penalty for expropriating is the permanent exclusion from the market of foreign …rms. Therefore, the period after expropriating the foreign investors, the country would be a closed economy. Upon this even, by optimizing the domestic formation of knowledge, the country would attain a (normalized) value
. Thererefore, after some simple algebra, the value # (m; R) attainable for a country when it expropriates, given (m; R), is
In equilibrium, foreign …rms can foresee the ex-post expropriation incentives of the country, and the entry of foreign knowledge m would be restricted to be below levels that trigger expropriation.
The optimal taxation program must satisfy the restriction that in every period, the next period allocation (m t+1 ; R t+1 ) implies of value of not expropriating, # EI (m t+1 ; R t+1 ) that is above the value of expropriation # (m t+1 ; R t+1 ). In recursive form, the optimal taxation problem restricted openness to foreign knowledge is always optimal when the country follows a Ramsey program.
More interestingly, the paper shows that the optimal tax program always lead developing countries to catch-up with the productive knowledge in developed countries.
Ongoing work extends the analysis along a number of dimensions. A …rst extension is to solve numerically for the optimal policies for the general case 0 < < 1, allowing for the vintage structure described in Section 3. The second extension considers the optimal policies for home when foreign is not following the optimal Ramsey program. I …nd that if G f > G SP it is not optimal for home to catch up with foreign; instead, the country will be better o¤ reaching a BGP in which the (excessive) growth of foreign knowledge pulls up the country via a positive presence of foreign …rms. On the other hand, if G f < G SP , the optimal policies for home country is to surpassing the foreign country; in this case, the ratio R will grow without bound at the rate
A third extension considers a two-country world in which the policies of home a¤ect foreign and viceversa. In equilibrium, the tax program of one country must be the best response of the tax program of the other. Standard game theoretic constructs will be applied to this setting and the equilibrium outcomes will be contrasted with recent policies in the OECD and large emerging market countries.
A Proofs and Other Analytical Details
Proof of Proposition 1. De…ne L (G) 1
and R (G) v 0 (G) v . A gross growth rate G > 0 is a BGP if L (G) = R (G) and that at that point R ( ) crosses L ( ). To prove both parts (a) and (b) …rst consider the case > 0. Notice that both functions are continuous, that R ( ) is always increasing and that L ( ) is also increasing because E < 1 and W < 1. Since the curvature of L ( ) is 1 + v and the curvature of R ( ) is only v, then L (G) > R (G) as G ! 1. But also notice that L (0) = 1 E > 0 and R (0) = 0. Therefore, either L (G) > R (G) for all G 0, or there exists a region [G L ; G H ] such that L (G) < R (G) for the interior, G L < G < G H , and L (G L ) = R (G L ) and L (G H ) = R (G H ) at the boundaries. For the latter to be the case, it is su¢cient and necessary
